University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

Working Papers

2017

Amicus Brief in Class v. United States
Albert W. Alschuler

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons

Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be
aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or
elsewhere.
Recommended Citation
Albert Alschuler, "Amicus Brief in Class v. United States," University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory
Paper Series, No. 640 (2017).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of
Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 640

AMICUS BRIEF IN CLASS V. UNITED STATES
Albert W. Alschuler
THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
October 2017

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048548

No. 16-424
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
RODNEY CLASS,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF OF ALBERT W. ALSCHULER AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER
MATTHEW J. SILVEIRA
JONES DAY
555 California St.
26th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104

ALBERT W. ALSCHULER
Counsel of Record
220 Tuttle Road
Cumberland, ME 04021
(207) 829-3963
a-alschuler@law. northwestern.edu

STEPHEN J. PETRANY
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048548

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 1
ARGUMENT .............................................................. 4
I.

Menna and Blackledge Support
Class’s Right to Challenge the
Constitutionality of the Statute
He Was Convicted of Violating,
and His Claim Is in Fact
Stronger Than the Claims
Upheld in Those Cases ......................... 4

II.

This Court’s Habeas Corpus
Decisions Have Afforded Special
Protection to the Right Not to Be
Convicted
Under
an
Unconstitutional Statute ...................... 7

III.

This Court Should Not Preclude
Defendants Who Plead Guilty
from
Obtaining
Greater
Protection of the Right to
Challenge
Unconstitutional
Statutes Than Class Seeks In
This Case ............................................. 13
A.

Post-Plea Challenges to
the Constitutionality of a
Defendant’s Statute of
Conviction Before Brady .......... 13

B.

The Enhanced Power of
Prosecutors ............................... 15

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048548

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
C.

Page
Boilerplate Waivers.................. 19

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 23

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137 (1995) .............................................. 11
Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21 (1974) .............................................. 1, 4
Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614 (1998) .................................... 2, 11, 12
Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 93 (1963) ................................................ 20
Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970) .............................................. 13
Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619 (1993) .............................................. 13
Bushell’s Case,
124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670) ............................. 8
Commonwealth v. Hinds,
101 Mass. 209 (1869) ........................................... 14
Ex parte Bigelow,
113 U.S. 328 (1885) ................................................ 9
Ex Parte Parks,
93 U.S. 18 (1876) .................................................... 9
Ex Parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371 (1879) ........................ 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 23

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651 (1884) ................................................ 9
Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) .............................................. 10
Hayes v. United States,
390 U.S. 85 (1968) ................................................ 15
In re Moran,
203 U.S. 105 (1906) ................................................ 9
Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156 (2012) ........................................ 18, 20
Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) ...................................... 11, 14, 15
Menna v. New York,
423 U.S. 61 (1975) .............................................. 1, 4
Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012) ................................................ 9
Missouri v. Frye,
566 U.S. 134 (2012) ........................................ 18, 20
Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) ........................................ 9, 10
Norwood v. State,
101 So. 366 (Miss. 1924) ...................................... 14
Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348 (2004) .............................................. 11

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989) .............................. 2, 10, 11, 23
United States v. Curcio,
712 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1983) ................................. 5
United States v. Ruiz,
536 U.S. 622 (2002) ........................................ 19, 20
United States v. Washington,
301 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ala.
2004) ..................................................................... 16
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Adam Liptak, Justices’ Ruling Expands
Rights of Accused in Plea Bargains,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2012 ................................... 21
Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect
System for Convicting the Innocent,
79 Albany L. Rev. 919 (2016)............................... 19
Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye:
Two Small Band-Aids for a
Festering Wound, 51 Duq. L. Rev.
673 (2013) ............................................................. 23
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 50 (1968) .................................................... 1

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Albert W. Alschuler, The Selling of the
Sentencing Guidelines, in The U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: Implications
for Criminal Justice 49
(Dean Champion ed., 1989) ................................. 17
Bill Otis, Comment on One Notable
Case Showing Impact of and Import
of Lafler and Frye, Sent’g L. & Pol’y
Blog (Nov. 26, 2012) ............................................. 21
Bryan Brown, The Right to Love: Fifty
Years Ago, in Loving v. Virginia, the
Supreme Court Made Mixed-Race
Marriages Legal Across the U.S.,
New York Times Upfront
(Jan. 9, 2017) ........................................................ 14
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Historical
Information .......................................................... 16
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Statistics ....................... 16
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 .................................................... 20
J. Vincent Aprile II, Waiving the
Integrity of the Criminal Justice
System, Crim. Just., Winter 2010 ....................... 22

vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Mark Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:
An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud.
459 (2004) ............................................................. 18
Mark L. Miller, Sentencing Equality
Pathology, 54 Emory L.J. 271 (2005) .................. 18
Memorandum from Deputy Attorney
General James M. Cole: Department
Policy on Waivers of Claims of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
(Oct. 14, 2014) ...................................................... 22
Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains that
Waive Claims of Ineffective
Assistance: Waiving Padilla and
Frye, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 647 (2013) ......................... 22
Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill,
Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 Duke L.J. 209
(2005) .................................................................... 20
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441
(1963) ...................................................................... 7

viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Peter Westin, Away From Waiver: A
Rationale for the Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal
Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214
(1977) ...................................................................... 5
R. Michael Cassidy, Some Reflections on
Ethics and Plea Bargaining: An
Essay in Honor of Fred Zacharias,
48 San Diego L. Rev. 93 (2011)............................ 22
Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right
to Appeal, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q.
127 (1995) ............................................................. 20
Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population
List 2 (11th ed. 2015) ........................................... 19
Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated
Justice, 122 Yale L.J. Online 35
(2012) .................................................................... 21
Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the
Criminal Justice System: An
Empirical and Constitutional
Analysis, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 73
(2015) .................................................................... 22

ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of
Tigard: Constitutional Rights as
Public Goods, 72 Denv. U. L. Rev.
859 (1995) ............................................................... 6
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Correctional
Populations in the U.S. 2015 (2016).................... 16
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Fifteen Years
of Guidelines Sentencing 90 (2004) ..................... 16
United States Attorneys’ Statistical
Report Fiscal Year 2015 ...................................... 17
Wikimedia Commons, File: U.S.
Incarceration Rates 1925
Onwards.png ........................................................ 16

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
I am a member of the Illinois Bar and the Julius
Kreeger Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology
Emeritus at the University of Chicago Law School. I
wrote my first article on guilty pleas and plea
bargaining nearly fifty years ago, see The
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 50 (1968), and I have published more than 700
law review pages on that subject. My interest in this
case is simply that of a friend of this Court.1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), and
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), support
Petitioner Rodney Class’s right to challenge on
appeal the constitutionality of the statute he was
convicted of violating. Class’s claim, like those
presented in Menna and Blackledge, would, if
successful, forever preclude the state from obtaining
a valid conviction against him. This claim should
survive his guilty plea.
1. In fact, Class’s claim should more clearly
survive his plea than those of the petitioners in
Menna and Blackledge. Unlike the petitioners in
those cases, a defendant who establishes the
unconstitutionality of his statute of conviction is
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, I declare that no
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part. My
co-counsel and I are the only people who have made monetary
contributions to the preparation and submission of this brief. In
accordance with Rule 37.3(a), all parties consented to the filing
of this brief. Petitioner provided blanket consent for all amicus
briefs. A copy of Respondent’s written consent was provided to
the clerk upon filing.
1
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innocent of any crime. Moreover, this defendant
vindicates not only his own right to engage in
constitutionally protected conduct but also the rights
of others, many of whom might lack the resources,
the legal standing, and the courage necessary to
protect these rights themselves. A defendant’s
successful challenge to the statute he is alleged to
have violated advances public interests as well as his
own.
2. In habeas corpus proceedings, this Court has
long afforded special protection to the right to
challenge an unconstitutional statute. Even at a time
when habeas petitioners were barred from
presenting almost all other constitutional claims,
this Court considered claims that petitioners had
been convicted of violating unconstitutional statutes.
Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). And when this
Court denied full retroactivity to most decisions
affording new constitutional protections to criminal
defendants, it made an exception for decisions
declaring “certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe”—in other words,
to decisions declaring substantive criminal statutes
invalid. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989).
Even a post-conviction petitioner who has pleaded
guilty without questioning the criminality of his
conduct may now obtain the benefit of a subsequent
ruling that his conduct was lawful. Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998). The Court should afford
no less protection to the right to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute on direct appeal than it
provides in post-conviction proceedings.

3
3. The final section of this brief asks the Court not
to preclude the possibility of affording greater
protection to the right to challenge an allegedly
unconstitutional statute than Class seeks here. Since
this Court upheld the constitutionality of plea
bargaining in 1970, this practice has become more
troublesome. Increased sentences reflect both the
efforts of prosecutors to gain plea bargaining
leverage and the willingness of legislatures to supply
it. Trials have become close to nonexistent.
Boilerplate waivers that were almost unheard of in
1970 are now commonplace.
Prosecutors might respond to a decision
recognizing Class’s right to challenge the
constitutionality of his statute of conviction by
generating more boilerplate. Because Class’s plea
agreement neither expressly preserved nor expressly
waived his right to challenge on appeal the
constitutionality of his statute of conviction, his brief
characterizes the issue in this case as what the
contractual default rule should be. Brief for Pet. at 1,
2, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 35, 38, 44. Although this
statement of the issue is accurate, it might convey
the impression that added contractual language
could make the right to challenge unconstitutional
statutes disappear. The Court should avoid
conveying this impression. It should make clear that
the effectiveness of boilerplate waivers remains
unresolved, as do other substantial issues.

4
ARGUMENT
I.

MENNA AND BLACKLEDGE SUPPORT CLASS’S
RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE STATUTE HE WAS CONVICTED OF
VIOLATING, AND HIS CLAIM IS IN FACT
STRONGER THAN THE CLAIMS UPHELD IN THOSE
CASES.

In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), and
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), this Court
held that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from
arguing on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings
that he was convicted in violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause or that he was prosecuted in
retaliation for exercising a procedural right. In this
case, Class maintains that his guilty plea should not
bar him from challenging on appeal the
constitutionality of his statute of conviction. Class’s
brief shows that, under the standard established by
Blackledge and Menna, his claim should survive his
plea. Demonstrating the statute’s unconstitutionality
would block his prosecution in the same way that a
successful claim of double jeopardy or vindictive
prosecution would.
Following the decisions in Blackledge and Menna,
Professor Westin offered the following formula as the
best way to reconcile these rulings with earlier
decisions that guilty pleas forfeit most claims of
antecedent constitutional violations:
[A] defendant who has been convicted on a plea
of guilty may challenge his conviction on any
ground that, if asserted before trial, would
forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid
conviction against him, regardless of how much
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the state might endeavor to correct the defect.
In other words, a plea of guilty may operate as a
forfeiture of all defenses except those that, once
raised, cannot be “cured.”
Peter Westin, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal
Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214, 1226 (1977); see
United States v. Curcio, 712 F.2d 1532, 1538 (2d Cir.
1983) (Friendly, J.) (declaring that Westin’s
“valuable commentary” has distilled the guiding
principles of the Supreme Court’s decisions
concerning guilty-plea forfeiture).
Certainly the fact that a defendant’s conduct was
not a crime should “forever preclude the state from
obtaining a valid conviction against him, regardless
of how much the state might endeavor to correct the
defect,” and Class maintains that the statute he has
been convicted of violating created no crime. His
claim of innocence only makes his case stronger than
those of the petitioners in Menna and Blackledge
themselves.
Punishing someone for engaging in noncriminal
behavior is obviously a grave injustice. Moreover, the
public has an especially strong interest in preventing
this injustice. Its resources are misspent when the
government imprisons people for doing what the
Constitution allows them to do. Beyond that, a
litigant who establishes the unconstitutionality of a
criminal statute vindicates the right of others to
engage in behavior like his. When a statute makes
this behavior a crime, it may not only chill but freeze
the exercise of a constitutional right. Fearing
punishment, people are likely to forego exercise of
this right. Few may have the courage, the resources,
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and the legal standing needed to challenge an
unconstitutional criminal statute.
Professor Merrill notes that “some constitutional
rights are not just private entitlements but also have
aspects of public goods. In other words, the exercise
of the right not only produces a private benefit for
the rights-holder, but also generates positive
externalities that benefit third parties or society
more generally.” Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of
Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72
Denv. U. L. Rev. 859, 862 (1995). Merrill uses
economic language to explain why courts should be
reluctant to find forfeitures of these rights and
sometimes should refuse to enforce waivers that
have been purchased by granting government
benefits: “[I]ndividual valuation of the right will fail
to take into account the positive externalities
generated by exercise of the right, and thus routine
enforcement of . . . waivers—especially on a mass
scale . . .—could result in a suboptimal supply of
these external benefits.” Id.
When a defendant is punished for violating an
unconstitutional statute, the injustice to the
defendant himself runs deep, and the public interest
in correcting this injustice runs deep too. The right
that Class asserts merits protection at least as much
as the rights vindicated in Menna and Blackledge. As
the following section of this brief will show, this
Court has long afforded distinctive protection to this
right.
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II. THIS COURT’S HABEAS CORPUS DECISIONS
HAVE AFFORDED SPECIAL PROTECTION TO THE
RIGHT NOT TO BE CONVICTED UNDER AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE.
In 1879, in Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879),
five prisoners convicted of violating a federal statute
sought a writ of habeas corpus from this Court. They
alleged that Congress had exceeded its power by
enacting the statute they were convicted of violating.
At the time, the Court adhered to “the black-letter
principle of the common law that the writ was simply
not available at all to one convicted of crime by a
court of competent jurisdiction.” Paul M. Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 466
(1963) (citing Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193
(1830)).
The Siebold Court reiterated this rule:
[The writ of habeas corpus] cannot be used as a
mere writ of error. Mere error in the judgment
or proceedings, under and by virtue of which a
party is imprisoned, constitutes no ground for
the issue of the writ. Hence, upon a return . . .
that the prisoner is detained under a conviction
and sentence by a court having jurisdiction of
the cause, the general rule is, that he will be
instantly remanded. . . . The only ground on
which this court, or any court, without some
special statute authorizing it, will give relief on
habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction
and sentence of another court is the want of
jurisdiction in such court over the person or the
cause, or some other matter rendering its
proceedings void.

8
100 U.S. at 375.
The Court nevertheless resolved on the merits the
petitioners’ claim that they had been convicted of
violating an invalid statute. It cited Bushell’s Case,
124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), noting that “[t]he
opinion of Chief Justice Vaughan in the case has
rarely been excelled for judicial eloquence.” Siebold,
100 U.S. at 376. In Bushell’s Case, the Court of
Common Pleas granted habeas corpus relief to a
juror who had defied a judge’s instructions by voting
to acquit William Penn of participating in an
unlawful assembly. The case established that courts
have no authority to hold jurors in contempt for
violating judicial instructions.
Siebold found a similar lack of authority when a
defendant was prosecuted for violating an
unconstitutional statute:
The validity of the judgments is assailed on the
ground that the acts of Congress under which
the indictments were found are unconstitutional.
If this position is well taken, it affects the
foundation of the whole proceedings. An
unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law.
An offence created by it is not a crime. A
conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but
is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of
imprisonment. . . . [P]ersonal liberty is of so
great moment in the eye of the law that the
judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not
deemed so conclusive but that . . . the question
of the court’s authority to try and imprison the
party may be reviewed on habeas corpus . . . .
[I]f the laws are unconstitutional and void, the
Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the
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causes. Its authority to indict and try the
petitioners arose solely upon these laws.
100 U.S. at 376-77. See also Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651, 654 (1884) (“If the law which defines the
offense and prescribes its punishment is void, the
court was without jurisdiction, and the prisoners
must be discharged.”).
This Court still quotes Siebold with reverence. See
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 730-31
(2016) (quoting Siebold while distinguishing
procedural errors from the violation of “categorical
constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal
laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s
power to impose”).2 Even at a time when this Court
refused to consider claims on habeas corpus that an
indictment did not state an offense, Ex Parte Parks,
93 U.S. 18 (1876), that a defendant had been placed
twice in jeopardy for the same offense, Ex parte
Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885), or that a defendant
had been compelled to incriminate himself, In re
Moran, 203 U.S. 105 (1906), it recognized an
obligation to afford relief to a defendant convicted
under an unconstitutional statute. Siebold shows the
distinctive character of the right asserted in this case.

Montgomery held that state courts must give retroactive
effect to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held
mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles
unconstitutional. Montgomery declared that “a court has no
authority to leave in place a conviction or sentence that violates
a substantive rule” and that “no grandfather clause . . . permits
States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids.” 136 S.
Ct. at 731.
2
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More than a century after Siebold, this Court
again gave this right special protection—protection it
did not afford to other rights, including those
vindicated in Blackledge and Menna. In Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Court adopted the
position Justice Harlan previously had taken on the
retroactivity
of
rulings
announcing
new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure. The Court
declared that newly announced procedural rules
must be applied to all untried cases and all cases on
trial or direct review when the rules are announced
but that, with two exceptions, these rules do not
entitle prisoners whose convictions were final at the
time they were announced to habeas corpus relief.
The second of the Court’s two exceptions allowed a
habeas petitioner to claim the benefit of a watershed
rule of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal
proceedings. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309-15. This
exception afforded full retroactivity to decisions like
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which
held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause entitles indigent defendants in state courts to
the assistance of appointed counsel. This Court has
not applied the second Teague exception to any postTeague ruling.3
The first Teague exception has been much more
influential. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra,
at 728-31. This exception was drawn verbatim from
Teague recognized that future decisions were unlikely to
trigger this exception. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (declaring it
“unlikely that many such components of basic due process have
yet to emerge”).
3
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Justice Harlan, and it allowed a habeas petitioner to
claim the benefit of a new rule that places “certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey
v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). This
exception afforded full retroactivity to decisions like
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which
recognized the constitutional right of people of
different races to marry. In this case, Class
maintains that that the Second Amendment places
his primary conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.
This Court effectively expanded the first Teague
exception when it held Teague’s limitation of the
habeas remedy inapplicable to new rules of
substantive criminal law. See Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004). The Court now affords
full retroactivity not only to decisions declaring
defendants’ conduct beyond the power of Congress to
proscribe but also to decisions declaring that
Congress has not in fact proscribed their conduct.
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998),
illustrates the breadth of the current doctrine. After
a post-conviction petitioner pleaded guilty to using a
firearm during a drug transaction, this Court held in
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), that
“use” required active employment of the firearm. The
petitioner asserted that his use was not active, and
this Court held that establishing his claim would
entitle him to post-conviction relief.
Bousley held Bailey fully retroactive because
“decisions of this Court holding that a substantive
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federal criminal statute does not reach certain
conduct . . . necessarily carry a significant risk that a
defendant stands convicted of ‘an act that the law
does not make criminal.’” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620
(quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 334
(1974)). Although the petitioner had not argued
before trial, at trial, or on appeal that “use” meant
active use and although he in fact had pleaded guilty,
his default would be excused if he could show that
the error in his case had “probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 623.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, “[O]ne
of the principal functions of habeas corpus [is] ‘to
assure that no man has been incarcerated under a
procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk
that the innocent will be convicted.’” Id. at 620.
Although both the petitioner in Bousley and Class
entered guilty pleas and although both maintained
that their conduct was not criminal, Class’s case is
stronger than that of the petitioner in Bousley in
several respects. First, unlike the petitioner in
Bousley, Class contends not only that he is innocent
but also that his conduct was constitutionally
protected—that this conduct was beyond Congress’s
power to proscribe. Second, unlike the petitioner in
Bousley, Class did not default his claim but instead
litigated it fully in the district court prior to his
guilty plea. Third, unlike the petitioner in Bousley,
Class can establish his claim without any expansion
of the record. And fourth, unlike the petitioner in
Bousley, Class asserts his claim on appeal rather
than in a post-conviction proceeding. Post-conviction
relief is limited to “persons whom society has
grievously wronged,” and “an error that may justify
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reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support
a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634 (1993).
This Court’s special treatment of claims on habeas
corpus that a prisoner has been convicted under an
unconstitutional statute (and, more recently, of
claims that a statute has been held not to reach his
conduct) indicates why Class’s guilty plea should not
bar his appeal in this case.
III. THIS
COURT
SHOULD
NOT
PRECLUDE
DEFENDANTS WHO PLEAD GUILTY FROM
OBTAINING GREATER PROTECTION OF THE
RIGHT TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTES THAN CLASS SEEKS IN THIS CASE.
In 1970, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970), this Court upheld the constitutionality of plea
bargaining. It declared, “[W]e cannot hold that it is
unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a
defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit
to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that
he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to
enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that
affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a
shorter period of time than might otherwise be
necessary.” 397 U.S. at 753. Since 1970, however, the
plea bargaining process has grown more troublesome.
A. Post-Plea
Challenges
to
the
Constitutionality of a Defendant’s
Statute of Conviction Before Brady
This case itself provides a minor indication of how
much things have changed. In an earlier era,
prosecutors and courts apparently did not imagine
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that a guilty plea would have the effect the
government now proposes to give it.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
anticipated the Menna standard more than a century
before Menna and explained why this standard
permitted challenges like Class’s: “The plea of guilty
is, of course, a confession of all the facts charged in
the indictment . . . . It is a waiver also of all merely
technical and formal objections . . . . But if the facts
alleged and admitted do not constitute a crime
against the laws of the Commonwealth, the
defendant
is
entitled
to
be
discharged.”
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210 (1869).
In 1924, a defendant who pleaded guilty appealed
his conviction to the Mississippi Supreme Court.
Although the defendant did not contend that the
statute of his conviction was unconstitutional, the
court noticed this statute’s unconstitutionality sua
sponte and reversed his conviction. Norwood v. State,
101 So. 366 (Miss. 1924).
Three years before Brady, in Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967), this Court reviewed the
convictions of a married couple who had struck a
bargain and entered guilty pleas to violating two
Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes. See id. at 3-4
(describing the defendants’ pleas); Bryan Brown, The
Right to Love: Fifty Years Ago, in Loving v. Virginia,
the Supreme Court Made Mixed-Race Marriages
Legal Across the U.S., New York Times Upfront (Jan.
9,
2017),
http://upfront.scholastic.com/issues/
01_09_17/the-right-to-love/ (describing the bargain).
This Court did not question the defendants’ right to
have their guilty pleas set aside and their convictions
vacated if the statutes were unconstitutional, and
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neither did the Commonwealth of Virginia. Its brief
defended the statutes without any suggestion that
the defendants’ pleas had “inherently” waived a
“nonjurisdictional” error—namely, their conviction of
actions that, far from being a crime, were
constitutionally protected. Brief of AppelleeRespondent, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(OT 1966 No. 395), 1967 WL 93641. Perhaps it was
unthinkable even to the Virginia prosecutors that
the state would continue to punish Richard and
Mildred Loving if they had done only what the
Constitution allowed them to do. If the position the
government urges in the present case had been the
law, however, this Court could not have made its
landmark decision in Loving.
A year after Loving, this Court again reviewed
and accepted an appellant’s contention that he had
pleaded guilty to violating an unconstitutional
statute—a gun-registration statute that required
him to incriminate himself. Justice Harlan’s opinion
for the Court addressed the issue posed by the
present case in a one-sentence footnote: “Petitioner’s
plea of guilty did not, of course, waive his previous
claim of constitutional privilege.” Hayes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.2 (1968).
B. The Enhanced Power of Prosecutors
The years since Brady have seen harsher
sentences, a sharp increase in the number of guilty
pleas, the near disappearance of trials, and the
explosion of prison populations. In 1970, fewer than
200,000 inmates were confined in state and federal
prisons. The rate of incarceration (the number of
inmates per 100,000 people) was 96. Today the
number of inmates confined in state and federal
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prisons exceeds 1.5 million (a greater than seven-fold
increase since 1970), and the incarceration rate is
471 (a five-fold increase). Wikimedia Commons, File:
U.S. Incarceration Rates 1925 Onwards.png,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:U.S._incarc
eration_rates_1925_onwards.png (last visited May
14, 2017).4
The federal prison population has grown from
approximately 24,000 in 1970, Federal Bureau of
Prisons,
Historical
Information,
https://www.bop.gov/about/history/, to 189,000 today
(a slightly less than eight-fold increase). Federal
Bureau
of
Prisons,
Statistics,
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_stati
stics.jsp (last visited May 14, 2017) (reporting the
total number of inmates on May 4, 2017).
Among the causes of the growth of the federal
prison population are mandatory minimum
sentences that, in practice, are mandatory only for
defendants convicted at trial. Compare United States
v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ala. 2004)
(bemoaning a judge’s duty to impose a “draconian”
forty-year sentence mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 924),
with U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Fifteen Years of
Guidelines Sentencing 90 (2004) (reporting that,
after the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
These figures do not include local jail inmates. With jail
inmates included, the total number of people imprisoned in
America becomes 2.1 million, and the incarceration rate
becomes 670. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Correctional Populations in the U.S. 2015 at 2 Table
1
&
4
Table
4
(2016),
https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf.
4
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charging and plea bargaining, only 20% of the
defendants whose offenses qualified for the
supposedly mandatory sentences prescribed by § 924
in fact received them). Both mandatory minimum
sentences and formerly mandatory sentencing
guidelines contributed to a doubling of the amount of
time a convicted federal offender could expect to
serve. Id. at 46.5
When the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
new, I wrote that, although they were likely to
increase the bargaining power of prosecutors,
“[g]uilty plea rates are currently so high that even
substantial increases in prosecutorial bargaining
power cannot yield great increases in these rates.”
Albert W. Alschuler, The Selling of the Sentencing
Guidelines, in The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:
Implications for Criminal Justice 49, 91 n.4 (Dean
Champion ed., 1989). But I was wrong. Guilty pleas,
which accounted for 87% of federal district court
convictions in the years before the Guidelines, see
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra, at 30, account for 97%
today. See United States Attorneys’ Statistical
Report
Fiscal
Year
2015,
Table
2A,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/file/831856/download.
As criminal caseloads and criminal dispositions have
grown, the absolute number of criminal trials in the
Harsher prison sentences are not the only reason for the
growth of the federal prison population. Even in periods of
falling crime rates, both federal criminal caseloads and the
proportion of convicted offenders sentenced to prison have
increased. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra, at vi, 76. It seems
likely that, by reducing the cost of imposing criminal
punishment, plea bargaining has given America more of it.
5
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federal district courts has declined—from 5,097 in
1962, to 3,574 in 2002, to 2,220 in 2015. Mark
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 493 (2004)
(providing the figures for 1962 and 2002); United
States Attorneys’ Statistical Report, supra, at Table
2A (providing the figure for 2015). Professor Miller
remarks that the Guidelines have “achieved the
virtual elimination of criminal trials in the federal
system.” Mark L. Miller, Sentencing Equality
Pathology, 54 Emory L.J. 271, 277 (2005).
In Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), this
Court noted, “[Defendants] who do take their case to
trial and lose receive longer sentences than even
Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate,
because the longer sentences exist on the books
largely for bargaining purposes.” Id. at 144 (quoting
Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1034 (2006)).
The Court added in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156
(2012), “The expected posttrial sentence is imposed
in only a few percent of cases. It is like the sticker
price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer
would view the full price as the norm and anything
less a bargain.” Id. at 168 (quoting Stephanos Bibas,
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 Calif. L.
Rev. 1117, 1138 (2011)).
The Court’s observations describe, not just
particular cases, but the American criminal justice
system generally. It is doubtful that any polity would
sentence 95 percent of all offenders to less than they
deserve or to less than is necessary to protect the
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public. Officials seem far more likely to impose “extra”
punishment on a small minority of offenders to
discourage exercise of the right to trial. The United
States now imprisons a higher proportion of its
population than any other nation in the world except
the Republic of Seychelles. Roy Walmsley, World
Prison Population List 2 (11th ed. 2015),
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resou
rces/downloads/world_prison_population_list_11th_e
dition_0.pdf. It could not have achieved its record for
mass incarceration by sentencing 95 percent of all
offenders to less than they deserve.6
C. Boilerplate Waivers
If this Court rules in Class’s favor, prosecutors are
likely to add language to plea agreements in an effort
to preclude challenges like his. This Court’s decisions
do not indicate whether their efforts would be
effective. The Court’s only examination of due
process limits on plea-bargained waivers came in
6

I have commented:
An agreement produced by an improper threat (“your
money or your life”) is involuntary, and a threat to
impose “extra” punishment for standing trial is surely
wrongful. The Constitution affords a right to trial,
which means at a minimum that the government may
not make standing trial a crime. . . . [The Supreme
Court’s empirical observations in Lafler and Frye]
decimate the “voluntariness,” “personal autonomy,”
“libertarian,” or “freedom of contract” defense of plea
bargaining.

Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the
Innocent, 79 Albany L. Rev. 919, 923-25 (2016).
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United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). Ruiz held
that the government may condition a plea agreement
upon a waiver of the right to receive impeachment
information from the government, but it left open
whether the Constitution bars the government from
insisting upon a waiver of the right to receive other
Brady material or a waiver of other rights. See id. at
629; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 93 (1963).
Prosecutors have used their power not only to
increase the number of guilty pleas but also to
transform guilty pleas into broader waivers of rights.
Agreements foreclosing the right to appeal were rare
when Brady was decided. See Robert K. Calhoun,
Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 127, 128-29 (1995) (declaring that appeal
waivers “emerged” “in recent years” and citing
decisions in 1982 and 1986 that called these waivers
“uncommon” and “not a widespread practice”). But
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now
recognize these waivers, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
(b)(1)(N) (requiring courts to determine that a
defendant understands “the terms of any pleaagreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to
collaterally attack the sentence”), and “[i]n nearly
two-thirds of the cases settled by plea agreement in
[a federal court] sample, the defendant waived his
right to review.” Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill,
Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy,
55 Duke L.J. 209, 212 (2005).
Other broad waivers remain controversial. In
Lafler, supra, and Frye, supra, this Court held that
defendants are denied the effective assistance of
counsel when their lawyers fail to inform them of
offers made by prosecutors and they later receive
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sentences more severe than the prosecutors proposed.
The Court’s rulings pleased many commentators, one
of whom observed, “The Supreme Court’s decisions in
these two cases constitute the single greatest
revolution in the criminal justice process since
Gideon v. Wainwright.” Adam Liptak, Justices’
Ruling Expands Rights of Accused in Plea Bargains,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2012, at A1 (quoting Wesley
Oliver). Another proclaimed, “Finally, the Court has
brought law to the shadowy plea-bargaining bazaar.”
Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122
Yale L.J. Online 35 (2012).
After this Court’s decisions, however, a former
federal prosecutor proposed adding the following
language to all plea agreements:
[T]he defendant is aware that defense counsel
vary considerably in quality and experience, and
that there is no advance guarantee that counsel
in this case will give sound or even competent
advice . . . . Knowing . . . that he may receive
poor advice from his counsel, and that such
advice (or failure to advise) may result in an
outcome less favorable than he would receive
with a typically competent lawyer, the
defendant waives any remedy that would
involve vacating his conviction or lessening the
sentence ultimately imposed, in exchange for
the government’s agreement to negotiate a
disposition of this case.
Bill Otis, Comment on One Notable Case Showing
Impact of and Import of Lafler and Frye, Sent’g L. &
Pol’y
Blog
(Nov.
26,
2012),
http://
sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/
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2012/11/one-notable-case-showing-impact-andimport-of-lafler-and-frye.html.
Perhaps this former prosecutor’s incantation can
make two “landmark” Supreme Court decisions
disappear, but courts, commentators, and state bar
ethics committees disagree about the permissibility
of the waivers he proposed. See Nancy J. King, Plea
Bargains that Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance:
Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 647, 64851, 662-65 (2013); Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the
Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and
Constitutional Analysis, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 73
(2015); J. Vincent Aprile II, Waiving the Integrity of
the Criminal Justice System, Crim. Just., Winter
2010, at 46; R. Michael Cassidy, Some Reflections on
Ethics and Plea Bargaining: An Essay in Honor of
Fred Zacharias, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 93, 108 (2011)
(“Insisting on so-called ineffective counsel waivers
impresses me as overreaching of the worst sort and
fundamentally inconsistent with a prosecutor’s
obligation as a minister of justice.”).
At present, the Justice Department does not allow
federal prosecutors to include waivers of the right to
effective legal assistance in their plea agreements.
See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
James M. Cole: Department Policy on Waivers of
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Oct. 14,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/file/70111/download
(declaring that although the Department of Justice
“is confident that a waiver of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is both legal and ethical,”
“[f]ederal prosecutors should no longer seek in plea
agreements to have a defendant waive claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
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Descriptions of this case as presenting only an
issue of what contractual default rule to apply could
convey the impression that added language
precluding constitutional challenges would be
unproblematic. Readers of the Court’s opinion in this
case should understand, however, that this issue
remains unresolved.
Despite my harsh criticism of plea bargaining, I
have acknowledged that “[t]he time for a crusade to
prohibit plea bargaining has passed.” Albert W.
Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for
a Festering Wound, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 673, 706 (2013).
Reservations about this practice nevertheless caution
in favor of preserving the ability to litigate issues of
special importance to the public—including the
constitutional validity of criminal statutes.
CONCLUSION
In cases like Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879),
and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), this Court
has afforded special protection to the right not to be
convicted under an unconstitutional statute. The
Court should protect this right by allowing Rodney
Class to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of
the statute he was convicted of violating. The Court
should also leave open the possibility of affording
this right greater protection than is at issue in this
case.
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